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April 1998 Barberis et al. (1996) is an exception.  It presents empirical evidence suggesting that the human capital effects
1
of privatization – selection of more skillful individuals to run firms – might be more important than incentive effects. 
The authors caution, however, that their results, based on the evidence concerning privatization of retail shops and small
enterprises in Russia, may not be applicable to larger, manufacturing enterprises.
I.  Introduction
There exists by now growing empirical evidence that privatization of state enterprises
significantly improves their performance, as measured by a variety of yardsticks.  Megginson,
Nash, and van Randenborgh  (1994) document significant improvements in post-privatization
performance of 61 large firms in 18 countries.  La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1977) provide
evidence from Mexico, while Frydman et al. (1997) and Pohl et al. (1997) examine medium-size
and large firms in Central and Eastern Europe and arrive at similar results.  Earlier findings by
Earle et al. (1994) and Barberis et al. (1996) provide evidence of the effectiveness of
privatization of retail shops and other small businesses in Central Europe and Russia,
respectively.  Frydman et al. (1997) also show that the performance improvements due to
privatization are the most immediate and striking in terms of revenue, and less pronounced on the
cost side of operations.  They further show that the better revenue performance of privatized
firms allows them to increase employment levels relative to state firms and that fears that
privatization might lead to social dislocations seem therefore unfounded.
That privatization is effective is very important.  But can we also explain why?  There are
several explanations advanced in this connection.  Some point to the politicization characteristic
of state firms, i.e. the fact that state officials are prone to impose on the management a variety of
objectives other than value maximization, such as minimization of layoffs, political patronage,
protecting of other state firms’ markets, etc. (Shleifer and Vishny [1994]).  While politicization
affects primarily the objective function of the persons in control of the firm, other explanations
focus on the greater ability of the privatized firms to accomplish the objectives they pursue.  This
advantage of privatized firms, which is sometimes seen as manifested in their greater
entrepreneurship, is said to be due to a better incentive structure of the persons charged with
making business decisions in private firms or to the better quality of the human capital they
employ (Barberis et al. [1996]).
So far there has been little empirical research to test these explanations . In this paper we
1
present the results of empirical analyses that attempt to operationalize the concepts ofDraft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 2
politicization and entrepreneurship and focus on the behavioral differences between privatized
and state firms that help explain why the former outperform the latter, i.e. on things that private
owners and their managers do or don't do that differentiate them from their state counterparts.
With respect to politicization, we present evidence that state involvement in the
monitoring of state enterprises results in inferior cost performance.  We also show, in particular,
that the employment policy of state firms departs from the standard business objective of value
maximization, and that the presence of active state monitoring leads to less employment
restructuring and lower layoffs.
Politicization does not, however, seem to be responsible for the state firms’ inferior
revenue performance, which is also independent of the degree to which a firm’s decisions are
actively monitored by state bureaucrats.  What is decisive here is the difference in the degree of
entrepreneurship manifested in the behavior of state and privatized firms, which makes the
privatized firms much more successful in revamping their product offerings and increasing their
sales.
In examining what determines the greater entrepreneurship of privatized firms, we test
and reject the hypothesis that the better performance of privatized firms is due to the more
thorough change of the old socialist management or to the greater ability of the new owners to
pick better managers.  We therefore argue in favor of the emphasis on the incentive effects of
privatization.  Looking beyond the differences in the average performance of state and privatized
firms, we provide hitherto unobserved evidence concerning the much greater variance of the
privatized firms’ performance relative to that of their state counterparts.  We connect this finding
to the different attitudes toward risk of the persons in control of state and privatized firms as well
as to the different degrees of accountability for their decisions, and through these factors, link the
ownership and entrepreneurship.
This study is based on a survey of medium-sized firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland.  In the overwhelming majority of cases the privatized firms in our sample have a
very concentrated structure of ownership and, although division of ownership and management isDraft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 3
 The sample on which the present study is based is described in Appendix B.
2
 The owners’ behavior may also be affected by the degree of the diversification of their investments. There are
3
indications that most owners of the firms in our sample are diversified.
the norm, the owners seem to be relatively active in monitoring their firms.  This means that
2
some of the differences between state and privatized firms we observe may be due to the
particular type of concentrated ownership in our sample, and private firms with more dispersed
(and less active) owners may not behave in the same way.
3
II.  Politicization
Politicization of decision-making on the firm level is often thought to be a hallmark of
state enterprises.  This may mean a number of things.  Management may be chosen for their
political rather than managerial skills (Barberis et al. [1996]).  Politicians in control of state firms
may impose on them a variety of objectives other than value maximization, such as maintenance
of employment, location of investment, choice of inputs, etc., which may foster their political
objectives (Shleifer and Vishny [1994]).  The multiplicity of objectives that state firms pursue
may make it very difficult to monitor, or even measure, their performance (Niskanen [1971]). 
Given the politicians’ stake in not letting state firms deteriorate or go bankrupt, managers of state
firms may be able to exploit the information asymmetry concerning the firm’s true financial
position and focus their activities on extracting rents from the state, rather than on improving
economic performance (Frydman and Rapaczynski [1994]).
The impact of politicization on cost and revenue performance
All of these factors affect the efficiency of state enterprises by raising various cost aspects
of their operations.  But politicization need not be the only deleterious effect of state ownership.  
We have hypothesized elsewhere (Frydman et al. [1997]) that, while the effects of politicization
show mostly in the inferior cost performance of state firms, differences in the degree of
entrepreneurship primarily affect the revenue performance of state and privatized firms.  Unlike
the more static and predictable cost cutting operations, capturing new sources of revenue (or
regaining the disappearing ones) is essentially a future-oriented task, unpredictable on the basisDraft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 4
 The question we asked was: “Would you characterize any state organ or agent as actively monitoring certain
4
decisions of the management of this enterprise? 
 Politicization may perhaps manifest itself in other ways.  For example, a firm’s behavior may be considered to
5
be politicized if its top management was chosen for political reasons, even though their decisions are later not actively
monitored.  We have no way of estimating accurately whether a firm’s management was or was not chosen for political
reasons.  We argue in section III. below, however, that systematic differences in the quality of a firm’s management are
unlikely to be primarily responsible for the differences in revenue performance between state and privatized firms in our
sample.
of past history, and often requires the type of entrepreneurial skills not that much different from
those needed to start a new business.  Consequently, even when state firms are free from political
interference, other factors may make them less entrepreneurial: the people in control of them may
be less able, or have less incentive, to spot various business opportunities, and they may have
different attitudes toward risk so that they may not pursue the opportunities they perceive. 
The difference between the ways in which ownership affects the cost and revenue aspects
of firm performance may be particularly stark in the postcommunist transition economies.  On
the one hand, the cost inefficiencies inherited from the communist past are relatively easily
identifiable and their remedies require essentially political will (which comes from
depoliticization of the firm’s decision making), rather than a spirit of entrepreneurship.  On the
other hand, due to the shock of the transition, including marketization and the collapse of the
COMECON, many firms lost their old captive markets, imports introduced overnight
competition, and buyers became more careful and demanding.  As a result, to maintain or raise
their revenues, the post-communist firms needed entrepreneurial skills to reinvent their products
and find the markets in which they could be sold. 
We begin in what follows by testing the hypothesis that politicization is primarily
responsible for the inferior cost performance of state firms, while another explanation is required
to account for their inferior revenue performance vis à vis privatized firms.  Despite widespread
belief that the state is essentially a passive owner of enterprises in Central Europe (e.g. Pistor and
Turkewitz [1997]),  we found that state bureaucrats were “actively monitoring” the management
in 40 percent of state-owned firms in our sample,  and we took this fact of active state
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monitoring as a proxy that a firm’s decisions are politicized.   Our hypothesis predicts that (1) the
5
very presence of active state monitoring, being tied to the pursuit of political objectives, results in
higher costs of a firm’s operation, but that (2) absent active state monitoring, the costDraft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 5
 The annualization method is explained in footnote 1 to Table 1.  For a discussion of potential problems
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resulting from the choice of the period over which the performance of firms is annualized, see Appendix A.
 The reasons for the inclusion of this interactive term, capturing the special (differential) impact of the initial
7
revenue level on the performance of privatized firms, are explained in more detail in Frydman et al.  (1998).  The
significance of the coefficient of this term indicates that the effects of privatization taper off with firm size.  Fuller
definitions of all the variables may be found in footnotes to Table 1.
performance of state-owned firms is essentially similar to that of privatized firms.  We further
predict that (3) the presence or absence of state monitoring is unrelated to the differences in the
revenue performance of state and privatized firms, which needs to be accounted for with the help
of other factors (such as entrepreneurship).
To test our hypothesis, we related the cost and revenue performance (measured in
annualized rates of growth ) of the firms in our sample to their ownership status (privatized vs.
6
state) and, in the case of state firms, to the presence or absence of active state monitoring.  We
also controlled for the country in which the firm was located and the initial value of the firm’s
performance (i.e. the initial level of costs and revenues, respectively).  Finally, because the initial
revenue levels affect state and privatized firms differently, we added an interactive term
measuring the differential effect of initial revenue levels on privatized firms.  The resulting
7
regression estimates are reported in Table 1, below.Draft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 6
TABLE 1: THE IMPACT OF STATE INVOLVEMENT ON COST AND REVENUE PERFORMANCE
OVER 1991-93 PERIOD
ANNUALIZED RATE OF GROWTH  OF
 1
REVENUE  COST/REVENUE 
Constant -13.53*  34.56*
  (3.51)  (6.26)
Privatized firms -1.70
2   24.42*
  (4.87)   (3.63)
State firm with active involvement of the   0.05
state   (4.49)
3
      6.22**
  (3.45)
Initial value of performance measure   -0.01
4
   (0.12) 
   -0.32*
  (0.05)
Initial level of revenues of privatized firms -
5     -0.39* 
  (0.16)
Hungary
6   -10.53*    -9.57*
  (4.48)  (3.12)
Poland   -4.85 -6.03
7
  (3.70)  (3.99)
n = 167 n  = 130
  F = 8.18*   F = 10.58* 
adj. R  =0.21 adj. R  =0.27
2 2
* p= 0.05, ** p = 0.10 ;  standard errors in parenthesis, significant coefficients bold-faced.  All equations estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS)
with the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix. 
  To smooth year-to-year variations in performance, the rates of growth of both revenues and costs/revenues are
1
annualized over the 1991-93 period for state firms and over the post-privatization period for privatized firms. (Thus, if Rt
denotes the value of a firm’s revenue level in year t, the annualized rate of revenue growth, ARRG, is an imputed rate
which satisfies R  /R = (1 + ARRG) .)  To eliminate possible bias due to the use different initial years in 1993 t  
(1993 - t )
calculating annualized rates of growth for state and privatized firms, Table A1 in Appendix A provides the regression
statistics which obtain when the rates of growth for state firms are annualized between 1990-93 and 1992-93.  (Note that
the choice of the initial year does not affect the significance or the order of magnitude of the estimates reported in this
Table.)  Revenues and costs are measured in constant local prices.
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is privatized, 0 otherwise
2
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state firm is actively monitored by the state, zero otherwise.
3
  For privatized firms, the initial values of revenue, and cost per unit of revenue are for the year of privatization. For state
4
firms, the initial values are those for 1991. (To avoid possible bias due to the use of different years for the initial values of
performance of state and privatized firms, the initial values for state firms in Table A1 in Appendix A are for 1990 and
1992, respectively; note, however, that the choice of the year does not affect the significance or the order of magnitude of
the estimates reported in this Table.)  Initial revenue is measured in US$1,000,000's.
  The coefficients of  initial cost per unit of revenue for privatized firms was not significant, and the corresponding
5
equation was re-estimated without this variables.
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is in Hungary, 0 otherwise
6
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Draft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 7
All three prongs of our hypothesis are supported by the regression estimates reported in
Table 1.  The comparison of the impact of state involvement on the cost and revenue
performance, graphically illustrated in Figure 1,  indicates that politicization affects primarily the
cost performance of state firms (p-value=0.07) and that in its absence, state firms engage in
effective cost restructuring.   By contrast, however, politicization seems to have no significant
impact on the revenue performance of state firms.  This means not only that the firms actively
monitored by the state do not lose their markets significantly faster than those in which the
management has more or less a free hand, but also that the yawning performance gap between the
state and privatized firms remains undiminished when the state does not seem to impose its
political objectives on the firms it owns. 
Figure 1 
The impact of state involvement on cost and revenue performanceDraft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 8
(One might object at this point that the results reported above are also compatible with
the proposition that the involvement of the state in firms characterized by faster cost growth is
not the cause but the effect of their poor performance, i.e. the state becomes involved because the
costs are growing and not vice versa.  As we shall see presently, however, state involvement is
also related to a smaller likelihood of future layoffs, and thus to a greater likelihood of higher
future costs.)
The impact of politicization on the employment behavior of state firms
In the remainder of this section, we analyze more closely the impact of politicization in
one particularly sensitive area:  the employment policies of state firms in the period of the
postcommunist transition.  In particular, we present evidence suggesting that while privatized
firms, in their employment policies, pursue the objective of value maximization, the managers of
state firms depart from this standard of business behavior. Moreover, we show that the managers
of state firms actively monitored by state bureaucrats reveal different attitudes toward layoffs
than the managers of state firms in which the state is not actively involved in monitoring.
Sharp employment declines characterized the early stages of the postcommunist transition
in all three countries under study in this paper.  (Blanchard, Commander, and Coricelli [1994];
Blanchard [1997].) In the environment of tightening budget constraints, these declines were in
part a result of the revenue collapse experienced by most firms losing the previously captive
markets for their goods.  But in part the employment decline was also an unavoidable
consequence of the communist labor policies.  During the communist period, unemployment was
politically unacceptable, and workers were kept on the job regardless of whether or not they
contributed to (or even detracted from) the efficiency of the enterprise.  Most firms in the
transition environment therefore inherited a very severe problem of overmanning, and mere
efficiency dictated that they reduce employment over and above any layoffs imposed on them by
the revenue declines attributable to the demand shock of the transition.  
Reflecting the broader changes in the whole population of firms, both privatized and state
firms in our sample underwent heavy employment downsizing, with the overall number of
employees declining in 91 percent of state and 57 percent of privatized firms between 1990 andDraft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 9
  88 CEOs of state and 78 CEOs privatized firms in the sample answered the question.  Of the 166 respondents,
8
27 (16%) considered the current employment level to be too low, 65 (39%) considered it about proper, and 74 (45%)
considered it (to a varying degree) too high.  Slightly fewer CEOs of state firms (35%) than those of privatized companies
(44%) considered the current employment levels in their firms to be about proper, the difference of no statistical sig-
nificance (p=0.16).  Since the small number of firms in which the managers considered the employment levels to be too
low did not allow for statistically meaningful contrasts, we have limited our analysis to firms in which the CEOs
considered the employment level to be either too high or about proper.
 The relationship between the chief executive’s judgment that employment is too high and the likelihood of
9
future layoffs should, in principle, be very strong.  The main reasons why the former might not be a fully accurate
predictor of the latter are that (1) the parties cannot predict changes in future circumstances and (2) some managers might
be constrained in laying off workers.
 Unfortunately our data do not allow us reliably to apportion a firm’s wage bill among full-time and part-time
10
or temporary employees, and thus we have only imperfect data on real wages of full time employees.  But using these
approximations, we found that in virtually all firms in our sample the drop in real wages was slower than the drop in
productivity.
1993.  Moreover, the process of labor shedding was clearly not completed by the time this study
was made (1994): when we asked the CEOs of the firms in our sample how they viewed the then
current level of employment in their companies, nearly half of them (45%) still considered it “too
high.”   We understood this to mean that future layoffs were perceived as desirable and to be
8
expected in a substantial proportion of both state and privatized firms, and we took the likelihood
of a top manager’s belief that his company’s employment was too high as a proxy for the
probability that the company would undergo further employment reductions in the future.
9
In order to determine whether decisions concerning these employment reductions are
made according to normal business standards or are subject to other (including political)
considerations, we made certain assumptions about how a firm interested in maximizing its value
would behave.  Unless real wages were falling faster than productivity,  a firm’s employment
10
behavior would presumably be sensitive to declines in its productivity (revenues per employee). 
For a firm operating under equilibrium conditions this would mean employment reductions in
response to falling marginal productivity.  We do not have marginal productivity figures for the
firms in our sample.  But it is also unlikely that firms in the early transition environment, facing
constantly changing demand conditions, can adequately measure changes in their marginal
productivity;  in fact, they are unlikely to have the requisite information about the employment
and production levels at which they might eventually reach an equilibrium.  What these firms do
know is that, buffeted by falling sales and suffering under the overmanning inherited from the old
regime, they are most likely below any equilibrium they might eventually reach, and they areDraft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 10
likely to react to changes in their average revenues per employee, since any falls in average
productivity are moving them further away from an eventual equilibrium.
On the basis of the foregoing, we have formed a hypothesis about the employment
behavior of the firms in our sample.  Our hypothesis predicts that the employment estimates by
the CEO’s of privatized firms, whom we believe to be pursuing the objective of value
maximization, are sensitive to prior productivity history: we expect that the more their
productivity has fallen in the past, the more likely are these CEOs to believe that the present
employment in their firms is too high, and thus the more likely they are to lay off people in the
future.  But for state firms, our hypothesis predicts a departure from the standard of value
maximizing behavior, and we expect no relationship between higher past productivity declines
and higher future layoffs.  Moreover, we predict that the politicization of state firms’ behavior, as
measured by the presence of state monitoring, contributes to these firms’ reluctance to engage in
future layoffs, regardless of what would be standard business behavior.
We tested this hypothesis by estimating two probit equations relating the probability of
future layoffs (as measured by the CEO’s belief that the employment in his firm is “too high) to
the past productivity history (measured by annualized rates of productivity growth) of state and
privatized firms, respectively.  Since our hypothesis did not predict any relationship between
employment behavior and past productivity history for firms with rising productivity, we limited
our sample to firms in which past productivity was falling.  To capture the effect of direct
politicization coming from the interference of state bureaucrats, we included a dummy variable
indicating the presence of active state monitoring.   Finally, we controlled for the initial
employment level, and the country in which the firm was located.  The estimates of the resulting
probit equations are reported in Table 2.Draft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 11
TABLE 2: THE PROBABILITY OF FUTURE LAYOFFS AS A FUNCTIONOF PRODUCTIVITY
HISTORY
(FOR FIRMS WITH DECLINING PRODUCTIVITY OVER 1991-93 PERIOD)




State firm with active involvement of the state -
1  -0.31*
(0.15)
Past productivity growth rate   0.014
2     -0.024**
  (0.013)   (0.010)





  (0.21) (0.24)
   -0.47**
Poland -
 5    -0.40**
(0.23)
n = 33 n  = 46
      P  =10.5 (d.f.=3)             P  =11.68 (d.f.=5)
2 2
* p = 0.05, ** p = 0.10 ;  Marginal effects based on probit estimates, standard errors in parenthesis, significant coefficients bold-faced.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state firm is actively monitored by the state, zero otherwise.
1
 Rate of growth of revenue per full-time employee annualized over 1991-93 period except for firms privatized in 1992
2
for which the rate is set to 1992-93 value. (Table A2 in Appendix A provides the estimates based on the growth of
productivity over the entire 1990-93 period. Note that the choice of the period of annualization does not substantially
affect the significance or the order of magnitude of the estimates reported in this Table.)Revenues are measured in
constant local prices.
 1991 employment (in 1,000's full-time employees) except for firms privatized in 1992 for which the initial employment
3
is that of 1992.  
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in Hungary, 0 otherwise.
4
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in Poland, 0 otherwise.
5Draft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 12
 To test this we estimated a version of the equation reported in Table 2 with the productivity history for state
11
firms split between those firms which were and those which were not monitored by the state.  The coefficients of both of
the interactive variables were insignificant.
The results in Table 2 support our hypothesis that state and privatized firms pursue
different objectives with respect to employment.  For privatized firms, a history of higher past
productivity declines is predictive of higher future layoffs (p-value = 0.07).  No such relation,
however, obtains for state firms.  The table also shows that the presence of state monitoring
significantly decreases the likelihood that a state firm will respond to past productivity declines
with increased layoffs in the future.  But the difference in the employment behavior of state and
privatized firms does not disappear even when state firms not actively monitored by their
bureaucratic superiors are separated from those in which the state is actively involved.    Thus,
11
although active state monitoring clearly increases the likelihood of the politicization of state
firms’ employment behavior, it may be an indication of the special political sensitivity of layoffs
that even those among state firms that are not actively monitored by higher state bureaucrats do
not systematically decrease their employment in response to higher productivity declines.
Finally, it may be worth noting that the politicization of the employment behavior of state
firms appears to be higher in Poland and Hungary than in the Czech Republic, since a state firm’s
location in either of these two countries makes it less likely that the firm will lay off workers,
regardless of past productivity declines.
III.  Entrepreneurship and its relation to ownership
We have seen that politicization goes a long way to explain the inefficient cost behavior
of state firms, but that other explanations are needed to account for their inferior revenue
performance.  We suggest that the explanation of the superior revenue performance of privatized
firms lies in their greater entrepreneurship.
The nature of entrepreneurship is sometimes explained in terms of different attitudes
toward risk (Knight [1921]) and in terms of the agents’ ability to spot and pursue business
opportunities.  (Hayek [1948], Kirzner [1979]).  But the concept of entrepreneurship remains
somewhat vague. In particular, it is usually left unclear what difference entrepreneurship makesDraft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 13
 For a recent discussion of the importance of incorporating entrepreneurship into the neoclassical theory of the
12
firm, its mesurement, and significance for understanding the demise of the planned economies, see Rosen (1997).  
 We defined a "product group" as “products which  are produced using essentially the same type of equipment
13
and production process, and do not differ substantially in the basic design.  Examples of product groups include leather
shoes, soaps, canned fruits, baked goods, beverages, etc.”
in behavioral terms and how it could be measured.   The exact relationship between ownership
12
and entrepreneurship also remains largely unexplored.
We focus here on the evidence of entrepreneurship in one specific type of economic
activity, namely, the restructuring of a firm’s product offerings in the wake of the postcommunist
transition.  This is a particularly important area of entrepreneurial behavior, given the collapse of
the captive market previously assured for the shoddy products of most firms by the communist
command economy, and the need of the postcommunist firms to “reinvent” their product
offerings under the new conditions.  Thus, a firm’s ability to retain or regain its markets through
a restructuring of its products is perhaps the most important manifestation of its ability to spot
and pursue business opportunities capable of generating higher revenues and, ultimately, higher
returns. 
In order to gauge the entrepreneurial behavior of a firm, we examine the type of product
restructuring measures it undertakes.  We find, however, that the mere incidence of product
restructuring is not what distinguishes privatized from state firms;  instead, while the presence of
product restructuring makes a great difference in the performance of privatized firms, its effect is
quite negligible in the case of state firms.  We conclude, therefore, that the substance of
entrepreneurship lies not in the simple fact of product restructuring, but rather in the way in
which the privatized firms go about it.  We then inquire into what makes private firms more
entrepreneurial.
Product restructuring measures and their effectiveness
We asked the chief production officers (CPOs) of our sample firms to list four product
groups which contributed most to the firm's gross annual revenues in each year for which we
collected our data.   We then asked them to identify changes in each of these groups introduced
13
in the subsequent year, and to list all new product groups (regardless of their contribution toDraft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 14
 In the context of the transition economies, we treat the introduction of major new production process and
14
major packaging changes as primarily proxies for product quality improvements akin to the introduction of new products.
 78% of the firms (83% of state and 74% of privatized) in our sample financed investments between 1990 and
15
1994 primarily from retained earnings.  The level of long-term debt among the firms that introduced major product
restructuring measures is also very low: the median is 3% of 1993 revenues.  Major product restructuring thus is very
likely to have direct impact on a firm’s cash position.
revenue) introduced during each year.
On the basis of these questions, we constructed a category of major product restructuring
measures by grouping together the following:  (i) introduction of new product groups; (ii)
introduction of major new products within an existing product group; (iii) major changes in
design or packaging of existing products; and (iv) introduction of major new production
processes.  The rationale behind this grouping was to isolate those changes in the firm's product
portfolio that are aimed at gaining new markets or retaining the vanishing old ones, rather than
simple cost-cutting operations.  An introduction of new or improved products may or may not
14
increase sales, but it is likely to require outlays that may contribute to a deterioration of a firm's
cash flows and/or balance sheet position.   Undertaking such innovations is more likely to
15
involve a substantially higher degree of uncertainty and higher business risk than implementing
cost-reducing measures.
  A bivariate comparison of the rate at which state and privatized firms introduce major
product restructuring measures shows that the mere frequency of restructuring is not a
distinguishing characteristic of privatized firms:  CPOs of 48% of state firms in the sample
indicated that their firms had introduced major product restructuring measures, a very similar
proportion to that of privatized firms (44%).  This result is consistent with previous reports of
extensive restructuring among state firms in the transition environment (Pinto, Belka, and
Krajewski [1993]).  In a more stable environment, state firms might perhaps be more relaxed
about their products and lag in innovation behind their private counterparts.  But the pressure of
the dramatic changes in the wake of the fall of communism seems to have simply taken the
bottom out from under many state firms, and forced them to try to recover some of the lost
ground.  Perhaps precisely because they were less able than privatized firms to stem the revenue
falls brought about by the change, they have tried repeatedly to modify their product offerings
and thus show a very high incidence of major product restructuring.Draft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 15
We thus hypothesized that what truly separates state and privatized firms is the
effectiveness of product restructuring.  In order to examine the effects of major product
restructuring measures undertaken by state and privatized enterprises, we estimated a firm’s
revenue growth as a function of an interactive variable combining the firm’s ownership (state or
privatized) and the fact of its having or not having introduced major product restructuring
measures.  We also controlled for the initial revenue level (including the differential initial
revenue effect for privatized firms, see footnote 7 above)and the country in which the firm is
located.  For firms that introduced major product changes we estimated the post-restructuring
revenue growth, while for firms that did not, we estimated the growth rate annualized over the
period from 1991 or the date of privatization to 1993.  The results are presented in Table 3.Draft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 16





Privatized firms that restructured their products
2 25.57*
(6.97)
Privatized firms that did not restructure their products
3 12.87*
(6.19)
State firms that did not restructure their products 4.17
4
 (4.38)
Initial value of revenues  -0.15
5
 (0.10)












* p = 0.05, ** p = 0.10 ;  standard errors in parenthesis, significant coefficients bold-faced.  All equations estimated by
ordinary least squares (OLS) with the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance
matrix. 
 For state or privatized firms that restructured their products in 1991, the post-restructuring rates of revenue growth are
1
annualized over the 1990-93 period (thus counting the performance in the year in which the restructuring measure was
introduced as part of the post-restructuring period); for those that restructured in 1992, the post-restructuring rate is for
1991-93, and for the firms that restructured in 1993, the rate is for 1992-93 period.  For state firms that did not undertake
restructuring of their products the rates are annualized over 1991-93.  For privatized firms that did not restructure their
products the rate of revenue growth is annualized between the year of privatization and 1993.  (To eliminate possible bias
due to the use different initial years in calculating annualized rates of growth for state firms that did not restructure their
products, state firms, and privatized firms, Table A3 in Appendix A provides the regression statistics which obtain when
the rates of growth for state firms that did not restructure their products are annualized between 1990-93 and 1992-93. 
Note that the choice of the initial year does not affect the significance or the order of magnitude of the estimates reported
in this Table.)
Revenues are measured in constant local prices.
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is privatized and restructured its products, 0 otherwise
2
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is privatized and did not restructure its products, 0 otherwise
3
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is state-owned and did not restructure its products, 0 otherwise
4
 For privatized firms, the initial values of revenue are for the year of privatization. For state firms, the initial values are
5
those for the first year of each post-restructuring rate of growth as specified in note 1 above (1990 for 1990-93 rates,
1991 for 1991-93 rates, and 1992 for 1992-93 rates).  Initial revenue is measured in US$1,000,000's. (Note that the
choice of year for the initial revenue does not substantially affect the results reported in the Table.). 
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is in Hungary, 0 otherwise
6
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is in Poland, 0 otherwise
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 Unfortunately, our data on many privatized firms in the sample does not go back far enough in time to enable
16
us to control for prior revenue history in the equation reported in Table 3. Since we have data on revenue history prior to
major product restructuring for state firms, we were able to check for this type of self-selection  [ Maddala (1983)] for
those firms and the results on the ineffectiveness of product restructuring for state firms remain virtually identical to the
ones reported in Table 3.
The estimates reported in Table 3 reveal a stark difference in the effect of major product
restructuring in state and privatized firms.  We have not been able to detect any systematic
differences in the type of restructuring engaged in by the two types of firms, as reported by their
CPOs.  But clearly, if state and privatized firms are engaged in superficially similar forms of
product restructuring, they must be doing something quite differently.  For state firms, revamping
product offerings does not bring any noticeable improvement in sales performance.  For
privatized firms, product restructuring is responsible for a significant (p-value = .04) increase in
the firm’s revenue growth: it adds, in fact, ca. 12 percentage points to the annual growth of a
median-sized privatized company.   This factor is apparently not the only one responsible for the
16
generally superior revenue performance of privatized firms, observed in Table 1, since even those
privatized firms that did not introduce major product changes outperform their state counterparts
(whether or not the latter engaged in any product restructuring).  But successful product
restructuring seems to account for a substantial portion of the revenue advantage that privatized
firms generally enjoy over state enterprises.  Indeed, it is the difference made by successful
product restructuring that moves an average privatized firm from a -5% annualized rate of
decline to a +7% annualized rate of revenue growth.
The contrasts between the restructuring effects for privatized and state firms are
illustrated in Figure 2 below which shows the post-restructuring performance of firms that have
restructured their product offerings relative to the revenue performance of those that have not.
The graph compares the performance of firms that are identical in all respects except for their
ownership and the presence or absence of restructuring. The vertical axis measures the ratio of
revenues of each type of firm to the revenues of state firms that restructured their products. 
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Figure 2
The impact of major product restructuring on revenue performance 
Why ownership matters?  The human capital hypothesis
We have seen that successful product restructuring explains a good part of the superior
revenue performance of privatized firms.  Nevertheless, product restructuring by itself does not
seem to capture the distinctive advantage of privatized firms over their state counterparts, since
state firms also engage in product restructuring, but without anything like the same results.  If we
are right that it is their greater entrepreneurship that gives the privatized firms their revenue
growth advantage, the nature of entrepreneurship may perhaps lie not in what privatized firms do,
but in how they do it.  Can we isolate some features of the modus operandi that makes privatized
firms succeed in the same activities that produce no significant benefits for state firms?
Barberis et al.  (1996) summarize two broad types of views previously advanced in the
economic literature on what gives the performance advantage to private businesses.  AccordingDraft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 19
to one view, the explanation lies in the differences in the incentive structures associated with
different types of ownership.  According to the other view, the superior performance of
privatized firms is primarily attributable to fact that privatization “selects owners and managers
who are better at running firms efficiently.”
The strikingly different impact of product restructuring measures on the performance of
state and privatized firms seems quite compatible with the idea that the persons in control of the
privatized firms are simply more skillful at what they do than their state counterparts.  We will
therefore begin by examining the possibility that the superiority of the privatized firms’
performance in our sample derives from the superior human capital of the persons who control
them.  To anticipate our conclusions, we find that while the quality of human capital is likely to
play some role in firm performance, it is not likely that changes in the management of the
privatized firms are among the primary reasons behind their superior revenue growth.  Indeed,
the evidence seems to favor the hypothesis that the incentives under which the persons in control
of state and privatized firms operate play a more important role.
Our survey provides extensive information about the managers of both state and
privatized firms, including their age, education, length of tenure, previous occupation, political
beliefs, attitudes toward market economy and political changes since 1989, opinions about the
role of the state and about the importance of various business objectives, etc.  All in all, despite
substantial efforts, we have been unable to identify any systematic differences between the
managers of state and privatized enterprises.  In particular, as may be seen from Table 4, it does
not seem to be the case that the managers of state enterprises are any more likely than their
counterparts in the privatized sector to have been members of the former nomenklatura, the
factor to which considerable importance has been ascribed in Barberis et al.  (1996).  Indeed,
unlike in Russia (where the small businesses studied by Barberis et al.  were located), the
managerial turnover in Central Europe has been very high (ca.  60%) in both state and privatized
firms;  the number of promotions from within (which may have been more likely to pick up
members of the old nomenklatura) is not very high, and also similar in both types of firms.  NorDraft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 20
 In additional to the data presented in Table 4, we also examined answers to a range of questions concerning
17
the managers’ political beliefs, attitudes toward reforms and the old regime, and their views concerning economic
priorities.  In none of these, did we find any important differences between the managers of state and privatized firms.
are the managers of privatized enterprises likely to be any younger than their state counterparts.
17
TABLE 4: CEO’S OF STATE AND PRIVATIZED COMPANIES
  PRIVATIZED FIRMS STATE FIRMS
Percentage of firms in which a new CEO was appointed 63 59
during the 1990-93 period 
        Of whom promoted from within (%) 54 61
Average age of the present CEO 47 45
Percentage of firms in which the present CEO is
       between 30 and 40 years old 16 22
       between 40 and 50 years old   47 53
       more than 50 years old 37 25
       One CEO in the sample (in a privatized firm) was below 30 years of age.
In order to compare more precisely the relative performance impact of managerial
changes with that of ownership transformations, we related a firm’s revenue growth to its
ownership status (privatized vs. state) and the presence or absence of a new CEO during the
1990-93 period, while controlling for the initial level of revenues (including the differential
effect of the initial revenue level on the performance of privatized firms; see footnote 7 above)
and the country in which the firm was located.  (See the left column in Table 5.)  To distinguish
further between the impact of internal managerial promotions (which are more likely to advance
former nomenklatura members) and that of presumably more radical managerial changes
involving appointments of corporate outsiders to the CEO’s position, we run another regression
equation with the same variables, but with the presence or absence of a new CEO split between
internal promotions and outside appointments.  (See the right column in Table 5.)  In both
equations, state firms in which the CEO did not change serve as a reference point.Draft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 21
TABLE 5: THE IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT CHANGE   
ON REVENUE PERFORMANCE 
OVER 1991-93 PERIOD
ANNUALIZED RATE OF REVENUE GROWTH  
 1
Constant -11.78* -10.61
  (4.82)    (4.86)
Privatized firm
2   18.93*    20.05*
  (5.04)     (5.19)
Firm in which a new CEO was appointed during the 1990-93   3.15  -
period    (3.25)
3
Firm in which a new CEO (appointed during the 1990-93 period) -    2.03
was promoted from within    (3.92)
4
Firm in which a new CEO (appointed during the 1990-93 period) -    1.66
came from outside     (3.87)
5
Initial level of revenues  -0.12   -0.12
6
 (0.11)     (0.11)
Initial level of revenues of privatized firms    -0.29**       -0.30**
 (0.16)     (0.19)
Hungary
7     -6.79**       -7.20**
  (4.16)     (4.27)
Poland  
 8     -6.76**       -7.23**
  (3.98)     (4.01)
n =179 n =175
F = 7.06* F = 6.27*
adj. R  =0.17 adj. R  = 0.17
2 2
* p = 0.05, ** p = 0.10 ;  standard errors in parenthesis, significant coefficients bold-faced.  All equations estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS)
with the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix. 
 For privatized firms, all rates of growth of revenue are annualized between the year of privatization and the end of 1993;
1
for state firms, the rates of growth are annualized between 1991 and 1993. (To eliminate possible bias due to the use
different initial years in calculating annualized rates of growth for state and privatized firms, Table A5 in Appendix A
provides the regression statistics which obtain when the rates of growth for state firms are annualized between 1990-93
and 1992-93.  Note that the choice of the initial year does not affect the significance or the order of magnitude of the
estimates reported in this Table.)  Revenues are measured in constant local prices.
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is privatized, 0 otherwise
2
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if a new CEO was appointed during the 1990-93 period, zero otherwise.
3
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the current CEO was promoted from within, zero otherwise.
4
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the current CEO came from outside, zero otherwise.
5
  For privatized firms, the initial levels of revenue are for the year of privatization. For state firms, the initial levels are
6
those for 1991. (To avoid possible bias due to the use of initial revenue levels for different years for state and privatized
firms, the initial levels for state firms in Table A.5 in Appendix A are for 1990 and 1992, respectively.  Note that the
choice of the year does not affect the significance or the order of magnitude of the estimates reported in this Table.) 
Initial revenue is measured in millions of US dollars.
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is in Hungary, 0 otherwise
7
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is in Poland, 0 otherwise
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 When the performance of state firms is evaluated over the 1992-93 period (see Appendix A), management
18
change has a significant (p=value = 8%) impact on revenue performance.  But even then, the impact of managerial
change on the revenues of a median firm ($6 mln.  in sales) amounts to less than 6 percentage points, while privatization
adds independently another 21 percentage points to the firm’s revenue growth (p-value less than 0.01).  The thrust of our
argument is not that the quality of human capital does not matter, but that it does not explain the most important effects of
privatization.
The results presented in Table 5 indicate that managerial change, whether involving an
internal promotion or an outside appointment of a new CEO, by itself has an insignificant impact
on a firm’s revenue performance, while the fact of privatization retains its highly significant
explanatory value.
18
But it might be said that it is not management change as such that matters, but the choice
of the new management made by an owner (as opposed to a state bureaucrat) who picks a CEO
for his or her skills in maximizing the firm’s value (as opposed to skills in pleasing state
officials).  We have therefore estimated yet another equation designed to test whether
management change makes a difference within the same ownership category, i.e. whether
privatized firms with new management perform better than those in which the management is
unchanged, and whether the same is true for state firms with new and old management.  In this
equation, we related a firm’s revenue growth to a variable interacting the firm’s ownership and
the fact of having or not having a new CEO appointed between 1990 and 1993 (for state firms) or
between the time of privatization and 1993 (for privatized firms).  We again controlled for initial
revenue levels (including the differential impact of the initial revenue level on the performance
of state firms; see footnote 7 above) and the country in which the firm was located.  Privatized
firms with no CEO change were, again, used as a reference group.  The results are presented in
Table 6, and indicate that differences in the quality of the human capital of the managers of state
and privatized firms are not primarily responsible for differences in the growth performance of
these firms.  Indeed, although the sign of the appropriate coefficient is positive, the difference
made with respect to the firm’s revenue growth by a post-privatization appointment of a new
CEO in a privatized firm is not significant.  At the same time a median-sized privatized firm in
which the CEO has not changed outperforms (p-value=0.06) a state firm of the same size,Draft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 23
 This result is not significantly changed if only outside CEO appointments, and not internal promotions, are
19
considered.  Nor are the results significantly affected if the changes of CEOs in 1993 are omitted (on the ground that they
may have been too recent to produce significant effects before the second half of 1994, when our study was conducted). 
Finally, the results are virtually identical if the managerial change in privatized firms includes both post- and pre-
privatization (and not only post-privatization) appointments, indicating that there may not be a great difference in the
quality of managers chosen by the new owners and those chosen by the state prior to (perhaps in preparation for)
privatization.
regardless of whether or not it has a new CEO, by ca. 12 percentage points per  annum.  
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TABLE 6: THE IMPACT OF MANAGEMENT CHANGE   
ON THE REVENUE PERFORMANCE OF STATE AND PRIVATIZED FIRMS 
OVER 1991-93 PERIOD
ANNUALIZED RATE OF REVENUE
GROWTH    1
Constant 4.70
(5.24)
Privatized firm in which new CEO was appointed in the year of privatization or 6.45
later (5.68)
2
State firm in which the CEO did not change during the 1990-93 period
3 -13.42* 
(5.64)
State firm in which the new CEO was appointed during the 1990-93 period  
4 -13.04* 
(6.70)
Initial level of revenues  -0.14 
5
(0.11)










adj. R  =0.15
2
* p = 0.05, ** p = 0.10 ;  standard errors in parenthesis, significant coefficients bold-faced.  All equations estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS)
with the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix. 
  For privatized firms, all rates of growth of revenue  are annualized between the year of privatization and the end of
1
1993; for state firms, the rates of growth are annualized between 1991 and 1993. (To eliminate possible bias due to the
use different initial years in calculating annualized rates of growth for state and privatized firms, Table A6 in Appendix
A provides the regression statistics which obtain when the rates of growth for state firms are annualized between 1990-93
and 1992-93.  Note that the choice of the initial year does not affect the significance or the order of magnitude of the
estimates reported in this Table.)  Revenues are measured in constant local prices.
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is privatized and a new CEO was appointed in the year of privatization or later,
2
zero otherwise.
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is state and its CEO did not change  during the 1990-93 period, zero otherwise.
3
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is state and a new CEO was appointed during the 1990-93 period, zero
4
otherwise.
  For privatized firms, the initial levels of revenue are for the year of privatization. For state firms, the initial levels are
5
those for 1991. (To avoid possible bias due to the use of initial revenue levels for different years for state and privatized
firms, the initial levels for state firms in Table A6 in Appendix A are for 1990 and 1992, respectively.  Note that the
choice of the year does not affect the significance or the order of magnitude of the estimates reported in this Table.) 
Initial revenue is measured in millions of US dollars.
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is in Hungary, 0 otherwise
6
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is in Poland, 0 otherwise
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Why ownership matters?  Risk attitudes and non-accountability
The fact that the superiority of the privatized firms’ performance is much less pronounced
with respect to cost-cutting measures than with respect to generation of new revenues (Table 1,
above; and Frydman et al.  [1997]) provides another indication that the performance differences
between these two types of firms are less likely to be due to differences in managerial skills
(which play a role in both cost- and revenue-side restructuring) than to differences in incentives
to use these skills in different types of situations.  Indeed, the difference between the cost- and
revenue-side restructuring may be instructive with respect to the differences between state and
privatized firms’ behavior.
We argued that cost restructuring is a matter of political will, while revenue generation is
a matter of entrepreneurship.  The reason why entrepreneurship is necessary to generate revenues
is that, unlike post-restructuring costs, future sales depend strongly on decisions of customers and
consumers which makes them inherently risky and unpredictable.  This, in turn, we believe,
makes two factors of special importance: the risk attitudes of the decision makers and the
constraints on the types of risks they can justify taking.  With respect to the first of these factors,
decision makers  in privatized firms have a different structure of payoffs from their decisions, as
compared to their counterparts in state-owned companies, which in turn influences their attitudes
toward risks.  With respect to the second factor, regardless of the payoffs attached to different
outcomes of particular decisions, the control structure of state firms, which requires that decision
makers be accountable for their decisions, may narrow the range of opportunities that managers
of state enterprises may be expected to pursue. 
Managers of state companies have their human capital heavily invested in their jobs and
are thus exposed to the downside of risky projects, the failure of which may threaten their
positions.  On the other hand, they have only limited expectation of a participation in the
potential upside of their decisions.  As a result, they are expected to be generally risk averse,
except when their firms are close to collapse (or when their jobs are already threatened because
of the firm’s inferior performance).  In the latter case, managers of state firms may be expected to
become risk prone because the downside of risky decisions becomes low to them (though not toDraft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 26
 The monitors of the managers of state firms have similar payoffs to the managers themselves.  Like the
20
managers, they derive limited benefits from the upside potential of risky decisions.  On the downside, on the other hand,
they are more likely to encounter political problems if the firms under their supervision go bankrupt (or require big
bailouts) than if their “scrap” value is wasted (so that they are willing to undertake very risky projects to keep the firms
afloat).
 Most privatized firms in our sample firms have very concentrated ownership (see Appendix B), and their
21
owners are likely to be involved in most major decisions:  94% of the managers of privatized companies in the sample
consult “regularly” (74%) or “occasionally” (20%) with their main shareholders.
 To be sure, a nondiversified owner may be risk averse.  Although we lack direct evidence on this, the types of
22
outside owners most common in our sample (foreign and domestic companies, investment funds) are likely to be quite
well diversified.
the firm), while an even small chance of success promises to save their jobs.
20
A different pattern of behavior may be expected from an owner of a firm (insofar as he is
active in company decisions).   Unlike the manager, an owner benefits from all the upside
21
potential of the firm’s decision, and although he must also bear the downside risk, his ability to
diversify it is much greater than that of the people in control of state-owned firms.  Consequently,
the owner may be expected to maximize the value of the firm and to be prepared to make risky
decisions, if the payoffs justify the risks.   Unless the firm is heavily leveraged (as few privatized
22
firms in our sample are; see footnote 14 above), the owner is also less likely than a manager of a
state firm to play Russian roulette with the firm when it is in financial difficulties, since the firm
may have some residual value even if its business is not going well.
This pattern of risk attitudes is quite consistent with the different effectiveness of product
restructuring measures we observe in our sample.  If the privatized firms engage in more risky
types of restructuring, attempting more radical changes and seizing the opportunities that present
themselves, they can expect consistently higher returns than their state-owned counterparts. 
Similarly, if state firms undertake the more risky forms of major product restructuring not in
response to opportunities that arise when their firms do relatively better and can focus on
changing their offerings, but rather when the firms are in distress and have to fight for survival,
the results may be expected to be inferior.
But there is yet another factor, much less commonly observed, which we believe to be of
great importance in accounting for the different behavior of state and privatized firms.  Quite
independently from their different attitudes toward risks, the owners of privatized firms also have
another advantage over the managers in charge of state enterprises in that they do not have toDraft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 27
 This difficulty is not due to any “deficiency” of the monitors to whom a manager is accountable.  Precisely
23
because entrepreneurship involves idiosyncratic, subjective insights, the monitors who are unpersuaded by them are not
only perfectly within their rights to reject them, but would also be derelict in their duty if they accepted them against their
own best judgment.
account to anyone for the decisions they make.  It is in the very nature of entrepreneurship that it
is not a science:  it does not proceed in accordance with well understood rules or knowledge that
can be objectively demonstrated.  (Kirzner [1979].)  Instead, entrepreneurial decisions involve a
large measure of ineffable skills and often quite idiosyncratic evaluations of the situation. 
Indeed, the very idiosyncratic nature of an entrepreneur’s approach, which allows him to succeed
by breaking the mold of routine, rule-governed behavior, makes it very difficult for him to
convey his “hunches” or “intuitions” to others whose views are within the prevailing consensus. 
A paradigmatic example of an entrepreneurial point of view is an idiosyncratic subjective
assignment of probabilities to events to which an objective (statistical) assignment of
probabilities is extremely difficult or impossible.  An assignment of probabilities is required to
calculate the expected payoffs from a creative project, such as a bet on a new product or a far-
reaching design change.  If such an assignment is subjective, it is difficult for a manager of a
state firm, in which the principles of bureaucratic accountability are necessarily the rule, to
pursue entrepreneurial projects, because the more entrepreneurial the manager’s decision, the
more trouble he will have explaining the reasons why he acted in this way and not another.  
23
This means that even if the decision is right, the manager might be unable to clear it in advance
with his monitors or, if he makes it on his own responsibility, explain it adequately if things go
wrong (Hayek [1948]). Decisions that are worth making, therefore, including many product
innovations that an owner, who need not account to anyone for what he does, will be likely to
make, may for this very reason not be taken by a manager of a state enterprise.  In other words,
the opportunity set from which an accountable manager picks his projects is narrowed down, as
compared to that faced by an owner, by the very fact of the manager’s accountability.
This suggests one more empirical test of the difference between state and privatized
enterprises.  If the opportunity set that accountable managers of state enterprises are likely to face
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different attitudes toward risk, are generally more likely to take justifiable risks than the
managers of state firms, the performance of privatized firms should be characterized not only by
higher averages, but also by a significantly greater variance of outcomes than that of state firms. 
This turns out to be the case, as may be seen from Figure 3 below which summarizes the
differences in the distributions of the annualized rates of revenue growth of privatized and state
firms over matching time periods.
Figure 3
Variability of revenue growth rates 
of privatized and state firmDraft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 29
The top row of Figure 3 shows the distributions of growth rates of privatized and state
firms.  While the performance of state firms is quite concentrated (with a narrow tail barely
reaching positive values of growth rates), the performance of privatized firms tends to be uniform
over the entire range.   The higher average rates of revenue growth of privatized firms are thus
accompanied by higher variances, shown in the middle part of Figure 3.  The overall distribution
of post-privatization rates of revenue growth of privatized firms has a higher mean and a higher
variance than the distribution of growth rates of state firms, with the differences in both moments
significant (at p-values less than or equal to 0.01) regardless of the time period over which the
performance of state firms is evaluated.  The differences in variability persists even when the
extreme values of performance are excluded.  The bottom graphs in Figure 3  show the growth
rates of the middle 50 percent of privatized and state firms.  Again, the upward shifts of the
median values of performance of privatized firms are accompanied by a pronounced lengthening
of the interquartile ranges.  
All of these results are consistent with our hypothesis that the superior results of product
restructuring by privatized firms are a function of their greater willingness to accept risks and
their freedom to make decisions without having to justify them to a hierarchy of state officials. 
Entrepreneurship certainly involves skills and abilities – risk taking and nonaccountability pay
off only when the decision maker uses them to good purpose.  But entrepreneurial skills may also
be inherently tied to private ownership because only private ownership may provide the proper
conditions for their exercise.Draft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 30
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APPENDIX A: PERFORMANCE ANNUALIZATION
In order to smooth year-to-year variations, the performance of the firms in the sample is
usually annualized over a number of years according to the following formula:  if P denotes a t
firm’s performance level in year t, the annualized rate of growth of performance, ARPG, is an
imputed rate which satisfies P /P = (1 + ARPG)  over the appropriate time interval (T - t), T T t  
(T - t )
> t. 
In the regressions reported in this paper the performance of privatized firms is generally
measured between the time of privatization and 1993 (which is the last year for which we have
complete annual data in our sample).  This raises the question of the period over which the
performance of state firms should be measured.  Ideally, the time interval should be the same for
state and privatized firms.  Otherwise, if 1990 was a bad recessionary year for all firms and if
many firms were privatized only in 1991 or 1992, a comparison of the growth rates of state firms
annualized over the 1990-1993 period with the growth rates of the privatized firms annualized
over the 1991-1993 or 1992-1993 periods may make the performance of state firms look
artificially weak.  But different firms were privatized at different times (1990, 1991, 1992), and
trying to keep the time interval the same for state and privatized firms would necessitate three
different sets of comparisons, each of which would compare a relatively small number of firms
privatized in a given year to the same set of state firms.  This would, in turn, make the results less
robust and the overall comparisons of state and privatized firms (regardless of the year in which
they were privatized) obscure.
We therefore decided, for most purposes, to group all the firms together.  As a result,
firms within the single "privatized” category have their post-privatization performance
annualized over different periods of time:  those privatized in 1990 between 1990 and 1993;
those privatized in 1991 between 1991 and 1993, and those privatized in 1992 between 1992 and
1993.  This makes the it clearly impossible to pick a single "matching" period for the evaluation
of the performance of state firms.  To avoid the problem created by the fact that the changing
macroeconomic environment might have caused all firms, state or privatized, to grow or decline
at different rates in different years, we estimated the performance of state firms over three
different periods: 1990-93, 1991-93, and 1992-93.  This produced three sets of estimates for each
equation, one of which (using the 1991-1993 period, which generally happens to be the most
“favorable” for state firms) is reported in the text of this paper, and the remaining two are
reproduced in this Appendix. Note, however, that with a few exceptions noted in the text, our
results are essentially invariant with respect to the time period used: the estimates retain their
signs and significance across all three sets, indicating that different macroeconomic conditions
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TABLE A1:  THE IMPACT OF STATE INVOLVEMENT ON COST AND REVENUE PERFORMANCE 
ANNUALIZED RATE OF GROWTH  OF 1
REVENUE  COST/REVENUE 
1990-93 1992-93 1990-93 1992-93
Constant -16.41* -15.35* 35.45* 36.58*
 (3.41)  (3.37) (5.89) (6.51)
Privatized firms -1.72 -2.87
2   27.31*   26.41*
 (4.64)  (4.89) (3.50) (3.65)
State firm with active involvement of   1.45  -2.97     4.94   
the state   (3.83)   (4.88) (4.22)
3
    6.02**
(3.30)
Initial value of performance   -0.05   0.09
measure     (0.08)     (0.11) (0.05) (0.06)
4
-0.33* -0.32*
Initial level of revenues of - -
privatized firms
5
    -0.36*     -0.50*
    (0.13)     (0.16)
Hungary
6    -10.58*    -10.80* -9.61* -11.67*
    (4.22)     (4.53) (3.08) (3.34)
Poland     -4.47    -5.26 -6.86 -5.78
7
    (3.65)     (3.86) (3.82) (4.29)
n =167 n =167 n  = 130 n  = 130
F = 10.62* F = 8.38* F = 11.09*  F = 8.29* 
adj. R  =0.26 adj. R  =0.21 adj. R  =0.28 adj. R  =0.22
2 2 2 2
* p # 0.05, ** p # 0.10 ;  standard errors in parenthesis, significant coefficients bold-faced.  All equations estimated by ordinary least squares
(OLS) with the White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix. 
 Rates of growth of both revenues and costs/revenues are annualized over the 1990-93 and 1992-93periods, respectively,
1
for state firms and over the post-privatization period for privatized firms.  Revenues and costs are measured in constant
local prices.
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is privatized, 0 otherwise
2
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state firm is actively monitored by the state, zero otherwise.
3
  For privatized firms, the initial values of revenue, and cost per unit of revenue are for the year of privatization. For state
4
firms, the initial values are those for 1990 and 1992, respectively.  Initial revenue is measured in US$1,000,000's.
  The coefficients of  initial cost per unit of revenue for privatized firms were not significant, and the corresponding
5
equation was re-estimated without this variables.
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is in Hungary, 0 otherwise
6
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is in Poland, 0 otherwise
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TABLE A2: THE PROBABILITY OF FUTURE LAYOFFS AS A FUNCTION OF PRODUCTIVITY
HISTORY
(FOR FIRMS WITH DECLINING PRODUCTIVITY OVER 1990-93 PERIOD)
PRIVATIZED FIRMS       STATE FIRMS 
Constant -0.33
 (0.28) (0.23)
    0.38**
State firm with active involvement of the state -
1   -0.25**
(0.15)
Past productivity growth rate   0.004
2    -0.025*
   (0.012)   (0.007)
Initial employment level 0.07








 5  -0.09  
(0.18)
n = 36 n  = 53
P  =12.0 (d.f.=3)            P  =6.71 (d.f.=5)
2 2
* p # 0.05, ** p # 0.10 ;  Marginal effects based on probit estimates, standard errors in parenthesis, significant coefficients
bold-faced.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state firm is actively monitored by the state, zero otherwise.
1
 Rate of growth of revenue per full-time employee annualized over 1990-93 period.  Revenues are measured in constant
2
local prices.
 1990 employment (in 1,000's full-time employees)
3
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in Hungary, 0 otherwise.
4
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in Poland, 0 otherwise.
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TABLE A3: THE IMPACT OF MAJOR PRODUCT RESTRUCTURING ON REVENUE GROWTH
ANNUALIZED RATE OF REVENUE GROWTH1
1990-93  1992-93
Constant   -9.42*    -9.12**
 (4.52) (4.86)
Privatized firms that restructured their products
2   27.01* 26.63*
  (6.59) (7.00)
Privatized firms that did not restructure their products
3   14.24*  13.87*
 (5.81) (6.23)
State firms that did not restructure their products  -0.83  1.98
4
  (3.72 ) (4.61)
Initial value of revenues   -0.11  -0.12 
5
  (0.08) (0.09)
Initial level of revenues for privatized firms -0.19 -0.17 
 (0.13) (0.14)
Hungary
6   -13.02*   -12.86* 
  (4.17)  (4.40)
Poland 
7   -12.87*   -13.00* 
  (4.37) (5.03)
n = 137 n=137
F = 8.72* F=7.40*
adj. R  =0.28 adj. R  =0.25
2 2
* p = 0.05, ** p = 0.10 ;  standard errors in parenthesis, significant coefficients bold-faced.  All equations estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS)
with the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix. 
 For state or privatized firms that restructured their products in 1991, the post-restructuring rates of revenue growth are
1
annualized over the 1990-93 period (thus counting the performance in the year in which the restructuring measure was
introduced as part of the post-restructuring period); for those that restructured in 1992, the post-restructuring rate is for
1991-93, and for the firms that restructured in 1993, the rate is for 1992-93 period.  For state firms that did not undertake
restructuring of their products the rates are annualized over 1990-93 and 1992-93 periods, respectively.  For privatized
firms that did not restructure their products the rate of revenue growth is annualized between the year of privatization and
1993.  Revenues are measured in constant local prices.
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is privatized and restructured its products, 0 otherwise
2
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is privatized and did not restructure its products, 0 otherwise
3
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is state-owned and did not restructure its products, 0 otherwise
4
 For privatized firms, the initial values of revenue are for the year of privatization. For state firms, the initial values are
5
those for the first year of each post-restructuring rate of growth as specified in note 1 above (1990 for 1990-93 rates,
1991 for 1991-93 rates, and 1992 for 1992-93 rates).  Initial revenue is measured in US$1,000,000's.
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is in Hungary, 0 otherwise
6
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is in Poland, 0 otherwise
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TABLE A5: THE IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT CHANGE   
ON REVENUE PERFORMANCE 
ANNUALIZED RATE OF REVENUE GROWTH   1 
1990-93     1992-93
Constant -15.31* -14.07       -17.07* -16.00*  
 (4.25) (4.29)      (4.57)  (4.63) 
Privatized firm
2  22.17* 23.14*     22.40* 23.41* 
 (4.58)    (4.98) (4.76)  (5.19) 
Firm in which a new CEO was appointed during the  4.05 -  - 
1990-93 period   (3.02)
3
       5.87**
    (3.34) 
Firm in which a new CEO (appointed during the 1990- - 2.49     - 4.70 
93 period) was promoted from within (3.70)  (3.95)
4
Firm in which a new CEO (appointed during the 1990- - 3.21     - 4.70 
93 period) came from outside  (3.62)  (4.21) 
5
Initial level of revenues  -0.11 -0.11     -0.11 -0.01  
6
 (0.07) (0.07)     (0.07) (0.10)  
Initial level of revenues of privatized firms   -0.30*   -0.31**     -0.30* -0.41*
 (0.14) (0.17)       (0.14)  (0.18) 
Hungary
7     -7.32**    -7.86**        -7.32**     -7.13**
 (3.96)     (3.96) (4.07)  (4.31) 
Poland   -6.61  
 8      -6.41**     -6.97**       -6.41**
 (3.81) (3.83)      (3.81) (4.31) 
n=179 n=175 n=179 n=175
F=9.97* F=8.86* F=7.64* F=6.67*
adj R =0.23 adj R =0.24 adj R =0.18 adj R =0.19
2 2 2 2
* p = 0.05, ** p = 0.10 ;  standard errors in parenthesis, significant coefficients bold-faced.  All equations estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS)
with the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix. 
 For privatized firms, all rates of growth of revenue are annualized between the year of privatization and the end of 1993;
1
for state firms, the rates of growth are annualized between 1990-93 and 1992-93, respectively. Revenues are measured in
constant local prices.
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is privatized, 0 otherwise
2
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if a new CEO was appointed during the 1990-93 period, zero otherwise.
3
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the current CEO was promoted from within, zero otherwise.
4
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the current CEO came from outside, zero otherwise.
5
  For privatized firms, the initial levels of revenue are for the year of privatization. For state firms, the initial levels are
6
those for 1990 and 1992, respectively.  Initial revenue is measured in millions of US dollars.
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is in Hungary, 0 otherwise
7
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is in Poland, 0 otherwise
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TABLE A6: THE IMPACT OF MANAGEMENT CHANGE   
ON THE REVENUE PERFORMANCE OF STATE AND PRIVATIZED FIRMS 




Privatized firm in which new CEO was appointed in 6.38 6.42
the year of privatization or later (5.66) (5.68)
2
State firm in which the CEO did not change during
the 1990-93 period (5.95)
3
-16.02*   -15.26* 
(5.36)
State firm in which the new CEO was appointed
during the 1990-93 period 
4
-17.40*   -20.25* 
(5.63)  (6.07)
Initial level of revenues  -0.01 
5   -0.13**
(0.07)  (0.1) 
Initial level of revenues of privatized firms   -0.24**  -0.36*
(0.14) (0.15)
Hungary -6.72 
6   -7.42**
(4.27)  (4.55)
Poland




adj R =0.21 adj R =0.16
2 2
* p = 0.05, ** p = 0.10 ;  standard errors in parenthesis, significant coefficients bold-faced.  All equations estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS)
with the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix. 
  For privatized firms, all rates of growth of revenue  are annualized between the year of privatization and the end of
1
1993; for state firms, the rates of growth are annualized between 1990-93 ands 1992-93, respectively. Revenues are
measured in constant local prices.
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is privatized and a new CEO was appointed in the year of privatization or later,
2
zero otherwise.
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is state and its CEO did not change  during the 1990-93 period, zero otherwise.
3
 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is state and a new CEO was appointed during the 1990-93 period, zero
4
otherwise.
  For privatized firms, the initial levels of revenue are for the year of privatization. For state firms, the initial levels are
5
those for 1990 or 1992, respectively.  Initial revenue is measured in millions of US dollars.
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is in Hungary, 0 otherwise
6
 A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is in Poland, 0 otherwise
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
The present study is based on a survey of 506 mid-size firms in the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland conducted in the fall of 1994.  The sample was drawn from firms
employing between 100 and 1,500 persons: the median 1993 employment in the sample was -
about 360 full-time employees, and the median 1993 sales were just short of US$ 6 million.  The
procedure used was to draw randomly from the list of firms provided by the Central Statistical
Office in each country, but when a maximum of firms with a certain type of owners was reached,
further firms with the same ownership type were not included in the survey.  (No such
adjustments were necessary in Hungary.)
Separate interviews (using different close-ended questionnaires) were conducted in each
firm with the chief executive officer, the chief financial officer, and the chief production officer.
An additional questionnaire, requesting time series data on revenues, labor and material costs,
employment, and taxes, was filled out at each firm by the accounting department.
The present study is based on a subsample of the original 506 firms.  Excluded were 88
private firms that were never state-owned, 86 firms the ownership of which was in doubt, 87
firms privatized in 1993 or 1994 (for which no post-privatization data was available), and a
varying number of firms (depending on the issue studied) that did not provide complete data on
some aspects of their performance.  (We have no reason to believe that the incompleteness of
data for certain firms introduces any systematic bias “in favor” or “against” any group of firms. 
The most common reason for incompleteness was lack availability or an obvious
misunderstanding of certain questions.)  A firm was considered privatized if it or its predecessor
was state-owned and the combined holdings of private parties gave them the power to block
major decisions at the general shareholder meeting.  In some (15%) of the firms classified as
privatized, the state remained a majority shareholder, but otherwise the generally high
concentration of holdings in our sample (reported below) makes the difference between blocking
and majority power of little significance.
The number of firms actually used in the analysis thus varies with the particular aspect of
performance and the time period under examination: for 1991-93 revenue performance data, the
sample included 167 firms;  for 1991-93 cost performance data, it included 130 firms.  (The
reason why the number of respondents is smaller for cost-related questions is that our cost data
are composites of labor and material costs time series, which increases the possibility of data
incompleteness.)  The distributions of sample firms by ownership type country, and industrial
sector are reproduced below. Draft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 39
B.1     COUNTRY DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE FIRMS
Firm type Czech R Hungary Poland* All
State firms**  23 15 42 80
Privatized firms  39 42   6 87
privatized in 1990***               -                  13                  2              15
privatized in 1991               5              12               4              21   
privatized in 1992             34               17               -             51
All 62  57 48 167
* Because many Polish firms were privatized late (after 1992) and many were privatized through leasing (and are excluded
from the subsample used in this paper beacause their ownership structure remains unclear), most of the privatized firms in
the subsample are in Hungary or the Czech Republic.
** Extensive tests revealed no significant performance differences between state and corporatized firms in our sample.
*** In the Czech Republic, the year of privatization refers to the year in which the new owners assumed control rather than
the year during which the shares were formally distributed
B.2    DISTRIBUTIONS OF INITIAL AND LAST-PERIOD REVENUES AND EMPLOYMENT
Firm type  (US$ mil, constant prices)   employment
Initial / ending revenue Initial / ending
  Firms Mean Median   Mean Median
Firms
ALL COUNTRIES
State    80   15.63 / 11.35     6.79 /  5.71 80 845 / 600 570 / 426
Privatized   87  14.86 / 14.25     6.56 /  8.40 77 711 / 621  400 / 344 
CZECH REPUBLIC
State    23   19.27 / 12.97    13.19 / 6.61 23 1232 / 797 832 / 580
Privatized   39     14.91 / 16.53         5.45 / 8.57 32    819 / 770  394 / 343
HUNGARY
State  15   26.78 / 17.06    10.38 / 7.88  14  578 / 483 431 / 368
Privatized   42   14.16 / 11.38      8.51 / 5.96  40  556 / 465 390 / 277
POLAND
State   42     9.66 /   8.43     5.30 /   4.55 43  726 / 534 543 / 413
Privatized   6  19.45 / 19.52   21.64 / 17.76  5 1256 / 914 883 / 903Draft of Apr 20, 1998 Ownership and Restructuring.  Page 40
B.3     SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE FIRMS ( TWO-DIGIT SIC CODES)
Industrial sector
Number  (%)  of 
state firms privatized firms  
Food&beverages 16  (20%) 27  (31%)
Clothing 11  (14%) 17  (20%)
Furniture 13  (16%)  6   ( 7%)
Textile   6  ( 7%)  7   ( 8%)
Leather   3  ( 4%)  6  ( 7%)
Chemicals 13  (16%)   8  ( 9%)
Non-ferrous minerals 15  (19%) 15  (17%)
Other  3  (  4%)   1  ( 1%)
80 (100%) 87 (100%)
  B.4     OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF PRIVATIZED FIRMS
Shareholder in which the shareholder when the shareholder is
Number of firms Mean holdings 
is the largest owner the largest owner
*
Foreign company 26        75%
Czech Republic            7     69%
Hungary                       17   82%
Poland                         2   40%
Privatization fund 16        20%
Czech Republic           16    20%
Domestic nonfinancial company   8        72%
Czech Republic          4   75%
Hungary          2   77%
Poland          2   59%
Domestic individual     5        66%
Czech Republic          2    72%
Hungary          2    52%
Poland          1    80%
State or state-owned company  14        44%
Czech Republic          6   36%
Hungary          7   49%
Poland          1   60%
Managerial employees    8        78%
Czech Republic          4   87%
Hungary          4   69%
Non-managerial employees    9        74%
Hungary         9   74% 
* For one Hungarian firm in the sample, the identity of the largest shareholder was not clear. 